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Abstract
In this paper we present a verification strategy for signalling principles for the control of a railway interlock-
ing system written in ladder logic. All translation steps have been implemented and tested on a real-world
example of a railway interlocking system. The steps in this translation are as follows: 1. The development
of a mathematical model of a railway interlocking system and the translation from ladder logic into this
model. 2. The development of verification conditions guaranteeing the correctness of safety conditions.
3. The verification of safety conditions using a satisfiability solver. 4. The generation of safety conditions
from signalling principles using a topological model of a railway yard.
Keywords: ladder logic, railway interlocking systems, SAT solvers, verification, automated theorem
proving, signalling principles, safety properties.
1 Introduction
In this paper we summarise the work carried out in the first author’s MRes The-
sis [9]. Within the scope of this project we have written software which allows for the
fully-automated verification of railway interlocking systems using SAT solver tech-
nology. This software has been applied to the interlocking of a small UK railway
yard.
Westinghouse Rail Systems, the project sponsor, is currently interested in ap-
plying formal methods to the development of software controlling the equipment on
the railway, i.e. signals and points. Software is developed using ladder logic, a low
level language representing Boolean-valued assignments. This software is simulated
by experienced signalling engineers to look for errors. The engineers will try many
scenarios, which are typically listed in signalling books.
1 The research described in this paper was carried out as a Master of Research (MRes) project by the first
author under the supervision of the second and third authors, and was supported by Westinghouse Rail
Systems, Chippenham, UK.
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This technique, commonly used in industry, catches many flaws in software,
but does not guarantee correctness of the ladder implementing signalling principles.
This research was commissioned to determine whether it is feasible to apply formal
methods to ladder logic and to verify that signalling principles hold in a ladder logic
program.
Part of the research was to implement a prototype verification system. This
system takes as input: the ladder logic to verify, a model of the railway yard, and a
signalling principle; if a counter-example is identified, the system provides a LATEX
document detailing the state of the system when the counter-example appears.
Signalling principles for the UK railway industry are written in plain English.
A second part of the research was to define a formal language in which to precisely
represent signalling principles. We have written a program which takes signalling
principles defined in this language, and produces safety conditions for which the
ladder logic is to be verified.
Overview
This paper is structured as follows. We start by providing some background knowl-
edge on railways and interlocking systems. We then provide a discussion of the
verification technique used in this research. Then a discussion of the production of
safety conditions from signalling principles follows. Finally, we present a survey of
related work and some conclusions to the research carried out.
2 Railways
Before explaining how the verification system works, we will provide some back-
ground information about the railway domain.
Railways are split up into railyards and open lines connecting the railyards. A
railyard would be a train station or a depot, see Figure 1 for an example railyard.
This research focuses on interlocking systems controlling railyards. A railway yard
is made up of the following components:
Track Segments. Train lines are split up into segments, and each segment is as-
sociated with a track circuit which can detect if a train is on the segment.
Signals. Signals are placed between track segments, and a signal is only visible
from one direction. Signals show different aspects; these aspects inform the train
driver about the state of the line ahead.
Points. Points are a special type of track segment used to merge two lines into one
line. A train can drive over a set of points if it has been locked, i.e. reached a
definite position, and has been so locked into position physically and by software.
The two possible positions of a set of points, when it is locked, are called normal
and reverse. The normal position is when the points allow trains to travel straight
over the points and reverse is when the points allow trains to branch on/off. 5
5 Although in many situations, like the example in Figure 1, it is clear which position is supposed to be
normal and which to be reverse, in general it is a matter of convention to make this decision (for instance
in the situation where a main line forks into two lines).
2
Kanso, Moller & Setzer
Each set of points in a railyard is given a unique identifier in addition to the
unique track segment identifier.
Routes. Routes are an abstract concept; they have no physical representation in
the real world. They consist of a sequence of sequentially-connected track seg-
ments that begin and end at signals, possibly through a set of points. Routes are
defined by control tables which are created when a railyard is designed. Routes
can be set to indicate that a train is using – or about to use – the route.
ts0a
ts0b
ts1a
ts1b
ts2a
ts2b
ts3a
ts3b
ts4a
ts4b
ts5a
ts5b
ts6a
ts6b
pt1 pt2
pt3 pt4
s1 s2 s3
s4 s5 s6
Signal
Points
Platform
Track Segment
Fig. 1. An example railway yard, all parts of the yard are named. The grey boxes on the right are platforms.
The arrows on the left side indicate the direction trains are supposed to travel down the lines. The black
boxes on the right are “end of line” markers. The “lollipops” named s1, s2, . . . , s6 are signals. The big
arrow depicts route C, see Table 1.
Track plans, such as presented in Figure 1, describe how these components are
topologically configured. The operation of the various components in a railyard is
defined using control tables. These contain information about when a route can be
set, positions of the points, and the aspect a signal should display. Control tables
are responsible for enforcing the signalling principles. Table 1 gives an example
control table defining four routes.
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A s1 s3
G Route Set ts1a, ts2a, ts3a, ts4a, ts5a,
ts6a
ts2*,
ts3*R Route Unset
B s1 s6
G Route Set ts1a, ts2a, ts3a, ts3b, ts4b,
ts5b, ts6b ts2* ts3*R Route Unset
C s2 s4
G Route Set ts4a, ts3a, ts2a, ts2b, ts1b,
ts0b
ts3* ts2*
R Route Unset
D s5 s4
G Route Set
ts4b, ts3b, ts2b, ts1b, ts0b ts2*,
ts3*R Route Unset
Table 1
An incomplete control table for the railway yard of Figure 1. The ‘Start’ and ‘Exit’ columns indicate
signals the route begins and ends at; the ‘Track Segments’ column displays track segments that must be
unoccupied for a train to enter the route. The two ‘Points’ columns together show the position that points
must be in for a route to be set. tsn* is short hand for tsna and tsnb. Route C is depicted in Figure 1.
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Route C from the control table is graphically depicted as a large arrow in Figure
1. Route C starts at signal s2 and ends at s4, and spans track segments ts4a, ts3a,
ts2a, ts2b and ts1b. Track segment ts0b is also required to be unoccupied before a
train is allowed to enter the route as a safety precaution.
3 Interlockings
Railway interlockings are designed to implement the constraints in the control ta-
bles. The interlockings this research is concerned with are programmed using ladder
logic. Ladder logic is a graphical representation of a sequence of Boolean assign-
ments. After carrying out this translation a sequence of Boolean-valued assignments
is obtained of the form
x1 := ϕ1; · · · xn := ϕn;
where ϕi are propositional formulæ with variables taken from the set of input,
output and intermediate propositional variables (latches).
The Boolean-valued assignment d := (a ∧ ¬b) ∨ c, as it would be presented
in ladder logic, is graphically depicted in Figure 2. The variables a, b, c and d
|a|
|c|
|6b| (d)
Fig. 2. Assignment Expressed in Ladder Logic
represent latches (propositional variables), 6b is a negation, and the brackets around
d indicate that it is the resultant. Literals in series such as a ∧ ¬b in Figure 2
represent conjunctions and literals in parallel represent disjunctions. The diagram’s
semantics are very similar to that of a circuit diagram, as ladder logic was originally
developed to program microchips.
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A ladder is executed by a program of the form
Initialise;
while(true){
output();
input();
x1 := ϕ1;
...
xn := ϕn; }
In the initialisation phase, some variables are set to initial values, while others
remain undefined. A continuous while loop is then entered in which the following
steps are carried out: the values of the output variables are sent to the signals,
points, etc.; the input variables are set to the inputs (states of buttons from the
control panel, sensors from the track segments, sensors from the points, etc.); and
the ladder is executed. Note that, while executing the assignments, the real world
output variables are not modified; therefore, correctness is only required at the end
of each execution of the ladder. (The system need not to be safe directly after
initialisation, since the system will be used with real trains only after the ladder
has been executed a given number of times, say n times. We require that the system
is correct after at least one execution of the ladder, but it would be sufficient to
require correctness after at least n steps.)
4 Verification
Verification of safety properties in systems defined with ladder logic can be achieved
in a number of different ways. Ladder logic is conceptually trivial to translate into
propositional logic; this is exploited to allow the verification to be performed within
the framework of propositional logic. Thus, safety conditions to be verified are also
defined in propositional logic.
The safety conditions are propositional formulæ in which the atomic propositions
range over the atomic propositions within the ladder. In this paper, ψ is used to
denote a safety condition, or the conjunction of safety conditions.
To prove the correctness of a safety condition ψ, we need to show that ψ holds
after executing the ladder n times for every n ≥ 1. Note that ψ is not required to
hold when n = 0 because the initial state is allowed to violate the safety conditions.
In our system, we prove this by induction: we show that ψ holds after initialisation
and one execution of the ladder; and that, if ψ holds before the execution of the
ladder, it holds afterwards as well. This technique is a strengthening of the first
method introduced by Fokkink in [8], see our Section 7 for a detailed comparison of
the two approaches.
More formally, we define a propositional formula ψI which defines the initial
state of the system (the ladder logic program does not assign a fixed value to all
variables in the initial state). For instance, if variables x, y, z are initially set to
values a, b, c, then ψI = (x ↔ a) ∧ (y ↔ b) ∧ (z ↔ c). Furthermore, we define a
formula ϕL which models the execution of the ladder. Assuming for simplicity that
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the xi are all different and represent the state of variables before execution of the
ladder, then ϕL has the form
(x′1 ↔ ϕ′1) ∧ · · · ∧ (x′n ↔ ϕ′n)
Here, x′i are new variables representing the state of the variables after execution;
and ϕ′i is the result of replacing x1, . . . , xi−1 by x
′
1, . . . , x
′
i−1. The first proof formula
corresponding to the base case has the form
ψI ∧ ϕL → ψ′
where ψ′ is the result of replacing atomic propositions x in ψ by x′. It expresses
that after the first iteration of the ladder the interlocking is in a safe state. The
second formula is the inductive step, and proves that from an arbitrary state where
the safety condition ψ holds, after executing the ladder the safety condition still
holds.
ψ ∧ ϕL → ψ′
These two formulæ should always hold to prove correctness of the safety condition
in the ladder. When employing a SAT solver, both formulæ are negated; thus, if
the safety condition holds, neither formula should be satisfiable.
When verifying the railway interlocking system, false positives were found.
There were two reasons for these:
1) Not all choices of input variables correspond to physically possible states. An
example is a 3-way switch which has 3 positions A, B, C (e.g. “control from
central panel”, “control by local station” and “control by emergency panel”).
The output of such a switch would then be represented by 3 variables, one
indicating whether A was chosen, one for B and one for C. At any time at
most one of A, B or C is chosen; possibly neither A, B or C is chosen while
the switch is between positions. Therefore we obtain the invariant
A→ (¬B ∧ ¬C)
∧ B → (¬A ∧ ¬C)
∧ C → (¬A ∧ ¬B)
2) Some combinations of variables are unreachable. When looking carefully at
false positives, it was usually found that some variables were in a state which
should not be reachable, typically when two variables are related to each other
(e.g. if the signal’s green aspect is activate, the red aspect is not activate).
When such a possible invariant ψInv was discovered (e.g. signali is red ↔
¬signali is green) we first tried to prove that it is in fact an invariant, i.e. that
it always holds:
(ϕI ∧ ϕL)→ ψ′Inv and (ψInv ∧ ϕL)→ ψ′Inv
If it was provable, we could assume that this invariant holds before executing
the ladder, thus relaxing the induction statement to:
(ψ ∧ ϕL ∧ ψInv)→ ψ′
It seems to be a major area of research to efficiently identify invariants auto-
matically.
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Example 1
If
• the initialisation sets variable a to true;
• the safety condition is b = a; and
• the ladder has one assignment representing a := b
then we obtain the formulæ
((a↔ true) ∧ a′ ↔ b)→ b↔ a′
and
((b↔ a) ∧ a′ ↔ b)→ b↔ a′
which, in this toy example, are provable. For the verification, we use a SAT solver
to search for a satisfying assignment which falsifies one of the two formulæ above.
Limitations
The proof system described above is limited in that we may obtain a false positive
when trying to verify a safety condition, that is, a counter-example which is not
real. There may be a state in which the safety condition and the invariant hold, but
such that after the execution of the ladder the safety condition is violated; however
it may be that the original state is unreachable. In order to find out whether the
counter-example is genuine, it is necessary to find a trace from the initial state
to the identified counter-example. This is not straight forward with our inductive
proof system 6 .
5 Translating Signalling Principles to Safety Condi-
tions
Signalling principles, as used in this research, refer directly to the railway industry.
They are used as heuristics by the designers and are typically written in a natural
language as precisely as possible.
One aim of the research is to define a formal unambiguous language with which
to formulate signalling principles. A typical signalling principle would be:
points in a rail yard should not be set to the normal and reverse positions simul-
taneously
Normal and reverse are the two possible positions of a set of locked points. Signalling
principles do not directly refer to any specific rail yard, or the entities with in them.
First order logic with general predicates is ideal for formally formulating these
principles; the above principle would be translated to:
∀pt ∈ Points : ¬[normal(pt) ∧ reverse(pt)]
These first order formulæ need to be translated into a propositional formula
(safety condition); to do this we built a topology model of the rail yard for which
6 Solutions for producing error traces are known but have not been explored in this research. One such
solution is to use time copies as introduced by Fokkink in [8] or apply a model checking technique that
successively identifies sets of reachable states from the initial state to the counter-example, yielding the
computation path [1,4].
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the interlocking was designed. A Prolog database is used for this topology model.
The entities in a rail yard are given names, and relations are used to model the
topographic aspect. For instance, two connected track segments would be related
using the binary predicate connected. For this research, the track plans and control
tables were (manually) converted into a Prolog database. This database can then
be automatically queried to help translate the signalling principles.
The translation has two steps: the first removes quantification, and the second
resolves predicates into literals from the ladder or a constant Boolean value depend-
ing on the context. Variables in the signalling principle range over finite domains,
as all rail yards are finite. Thus, universal quantification can be replaced by a finite
conjunction, and existential quantification can be replaced by a finite disjunction.
The topology model would be queried for a finite set of quantified values. For in-
stance the variable pt in the example signalling principle introduced ranges over the
domain of all points in the rail yard.
Secondly, the predicates are resolved into literals. This is done by specifying a
list of predicates and how they are reduced. This list is unique for each rail yard, as
different rail yards follow different naming conventions. For instance, the predicate
normal(pt) used in the example signalling principle would be reduced to a literal
“pt.Normal” by means of a string concatenation operation. Predicates that are not
specified in the rail yard specific list are resolved using Prolog, and the topology
model, to a constant Boolean value (see Example 2 below). Thus, the second class
of predicates greatly simplifies the formulation of signalling principles, as a safety
condition can be given a guard.
Example 2
Consider a signalling principle such as
all points that are part of a route must be locked if the route is set
formalised as
∀pt ∈ Points : ∀rt ∈ Routes : point part of(pt, rt)→ [set(rt)→ locked(pt)]
where the predicates set(rt) and locked(pt) are reduced to literals, and
point part of(pt, rt) is reduced to tt if point pt is part of route rt within the topol-
ogy model, and to ff otherwise. In this case, the verification consists of proving
that set(rt)→ locked(pt) holds for all cases where point pt is part of route rt.
Example 3
Consider a simple rail yard with only two points pta and ptb and a signalling prin-
ciple
∀pt ∈ Points : ¬[normal(pt) ∧ reverse(pt)]
After removal of the quantification and predicates, the following safety condition is
produced
¬[pta.Normal ∧ pta.Reverse] ∧ ¬[ptb.Normal ∧ ptb.Reverse]
In order to identify more precisely the reason for a possible counter-example, the
safety conditions – which often form a large conjunction – are split into their con-
juncts which form more specific safety conditions.
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Clause Set
Number of
Clauses
Number of
Variables
OKSolver
Running
Time
(Seconds)
pointsNotNormalAndReverse0 14713 4076 0.06
pointsNotNormalAndReverse0.ind 12916 3559 0.06
pointsNotNormalAndReverse1 14713 4076 0.13
pointsNotNormalAndReverse1.ind 12916 3559 0.14
occupiedPointsLocked0 14713 4076 0.25
occupiedPointsLocked0.ind 12930 3560 1.34
occupiedPointsLocked1 14713 4076 0.21
occupiedPointsLocked1.ind 12930 3560 1.33
occupiedPointsLocked2 14716 4076 0.25
occupiedPointsLocked2.ind 12930 3560 1.37
occupiedPointsLocked3 14713 4076 0.27
occupiedPointsLocked3.ind 12930 3560 1.3
Table 2
Clause sets and there verification time, the clause sets in italic are satisfiable. Clause sets that end with
ind are the inductive step of the verification, those without are the base cases.
6 Implementation
The software implemented for this research takes as input a signalling principle,
an interlocking’s ladder logic, and a topology model; using these inputs, it gen-
erates clause sets and starts the verification. LATEX documentation is produced
if a counter-example is identified. The SAT-Solver used for this project is called
OKSolver, written by Kullmann [12,10], which is part of the OKlibrary [11]. The in-
terlocking verified has 331 assignments and 599 variables. For illustration purposes,
two signalling principles have been verified; Table 2 contains information about the
verification of the clauses. The first section in the table verifies that the interlocking
can never move the points to the normal and reverse position in the same execution
cycle. The second section shows that counter-examples have been identified while
attempting to verify that if a point is occupied, then it is locked into position. This
second signalling principle is only for demonstration purposes and does not mean
the railway is unsafe, as the proof system allows for trains to magically appear and
disappear. Thus, if a point is not locked, then the SAT-Solver will place a train on
the point, thus creating a counter-example.
Interestingly, the first signalling principle, when the clause sets are all unsat-
isfiable, has a very fast running time while verifying the clause sets. The second
signalling principle, when the clause sets are all satisfiable, has a greater average
running time, especially through the inductive steps.
9
Kanso, Moller & Setzer
7 Related Work
There have been many attempts to apply formal methods to railways and their
associated interlockings. Indeed, this is the subject of the TRain Grand Challenge
proposed by Dines Bjørner [3].
Eriksson has applied formal methods to the problem with great success for over
ten years in this, notably on behalf of Banverket (the Swedish National Rail Ad-
ministration) [5,6,7]. This approach works by creating two mathematical models:
the first is that of the interlocking and consists of rules, and the second is of the
topological aspects of the railway yard for which the interlocking has been designed.
Verification proceeds by proving that a signalling principle holds for the interlocking
model in the topology model of the railyard. The NP-Tools software produced by
the company Prover 7 was used for the verification [5]. NP-Tools is a collection of
tools packaged with a proof engine; these tools translate various problems into an
acceptable format for the proof engine to process. NP-Tools has been used by many
other companies for formal verification of critical systems such as ADTranz, Saab
and Volvo.
Fokkink demonstrated how an interlocking programmed using ladder logic can
be automatically verified to ensure that it implements the control tables correctly
[8]. This work did not cover the direct verification of signalling principles; only
safety conditions that were derived from the control tables were verified. The paper
discusses two verification techniques. The first proves that a safety condition is a
logical consequence of executing the ladder. Let ϕL be a model of the ladder in
propositional logic and ψ be a safety requirement. The proof obligation used by
Fokkink is
ϕL → ψ′
If this obligation holds it proves that after any execution of the ladder the safety
requirement will always hold, even if the system was in an unreachable state before
executing the ladder. Note that our approach only demands that the obligation
hold if, before the execution of the ladder, the system was in an initial state or in a
state where the safety requirements hold as well. Our approach, therefore, restricts
the number of states for which the safety condition is required to hold to a smaller
set of states which contains all reachable states. By adding invariants, we further
cut down the number of states to be considered, therefore reducing the number of
false positives.
The second technique introduced by Fokkink creates time copies of the propo-
sitional model of the ladder. He introduces variables xi(j) denoting the state of
variable xi after j executions of the ladder 8 . A time copy ϕ(i) would be the same
as ϕ with all of the atomic propositions x in ϕ replaced by x(i). This technique does
not show that after any execution of the ladder the safety requirement will hold,
but only after a finite number k of executions of the ladder. The proof obligation is
ϕ(0) ∧ ϕ(1) ∧ . . . ∧ ϕ(k)→ ψ(k)
This technique can be used to prove temporal safety requirements, but is deprecated
7 www.prover.com
8 So in our notation xi denotes xi(0) and x
′
i denotes xi(1).
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as such safety conditions are verified for only a finite number of iterations; there
will always be uncertainty as to whether the safety requirements hold beyond k
iterations of the ladder. However, if a counter-example is found, then it is the case
that the counter-example is reachable, and from a falsifying assignment we obtain
a trace from the initial state to it.
8 Conclusion
Our approach was applied to a model provided by our industrial sponsor of a modest
yet typical railway yard with 331 assignments and 599 variables, representing a
station with two platforms and one railway line with two tracks feeding into it. The
running time of the SAT solver itself was never longer than a couple of seconds.
We were able to prove a large variety of safety conditions. We found some counter-
examples, which were however already known to the company but recognised not
to be safety critical, being intermittent and occurring for only one cycle of the
ladder. In order to prove that these counter-examples really occur only for at most
one cycle, we could adapt the proof obligation and prove that if the system is in a
state in which the safety condition ψ does not hold, then it will hold after a single
execution of the ladder. The proof formula would be
¬ψ ∧ ϕL → ψ′
and we could restrict it to states fulfilling the invariant, i.e.
¬ψ ∧ ψInv ∧ ϕL → ψ′
We do not know how well our approach scales up, since we have only applied
it to a modest rail yard. Current interlockings being developed have over 3000 as-
signments. We do not anticipate any serious problems although the nature of the
satisfiability problem means that complexity will grow exponentially when attempt-
ing to verify interlockings with more and more assignments.
This project demonstrates that automated verification of railway interlocking
systems, at least for smaller examples, is feasible. The main advantages of our
approach is its simplicity and that it verifies safety at the lowest level – which is
actually executed – thus avoiding compiler errors from translating from a high level
language.
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